

Cody

lecture at SAIS

Wayne Smith - can get an audience at SAIS

Kary Biers, dir. of COHA (think tank, lobbying  
Smith on

or anal. at Nat Educ. Assoc.



Daddy Skinn

Woodrow Wilson School -

(SAIS - East Russia)

Bill Miller - Pres of US-East Relations  
(Cold War - East-West Accord)

SH:

Walter P. Santand

Roy Santoff

1111 National Press Bldg. Wash DC  
20045



6 Nov 89

Washigto

B

Boston

Elmhurst

Moscow

Guthrie

de la, de la

Zhukin

de la, de la

Karaguzov

Steinberg

Jerry, NY

Kontinow

(Benny Hunt?)

Snyder

Prinkov

Bent

Sagan

Mil'stein

Roskin

Trofimov

Ritchison

Koboshin

Hersh

Larionov

Ravenel

Alexis Ambrose

LaRoque

A.A. Vasil' yev

McMichael

Volkov

Shakunov

Dobroshin

Paul Bui

Velikov

Bovin



Continent

Wang

148. Was CII an episode of (Neth-like) <sup>high-</sup> risk-taking?

(see \_\_\_\_\_)

of K? \_\_\_\_\_ or of JFK? (as seen by \_\_\_\_\_)

Did K & Palumbo see high risks?

Should they have, necessarily?

Was K without any basis for his confidence?

(Was it based on a sense of JFK "cowardice,  
weakness"?)

Thus, was Brigham much more cautious?

(What if he had been wrong about Czech, or  
Afghanistan - US reaction?)

To a degree, he was; Carter felt  
"betrayed" — and did react strongly!

vis. CA = Afghanistan?

F.M.A. ?!

(and see Aug 80!) (then 'Crisis')



See Kopf, Ennis, p. 157 - on books in 1964 of  
US public opinion: gradually coming around  
(+ Pres?) - as I was, by RT!

27 Nov 88

CA as Provocation  
for US action "in retab.", or  
"to support" "allies" ...

CI (Shubert)

<sup>Supra</sup>  
CI (Hissling; Baker + Sen Wilson  
on Morgenthau!)

Centres:

Elbal White Paper - Elbal [+ Nanta: ship for Elbal -  
34A! (TG; after ...) (through Panama - Noriega)

(and to get Res from Congress;

as in CI, problem of planned attacks  
on Guantanamo may have been to commit

Pres - the JFK's hands...

- ? N's SECRET BOMBING OF CAMBODIA: PROV? AS WELL AS DEMO?

- Persian Gulf strategy?!

See actual use by R of attack on  
Stamps! even though it was by Greg! (+ Kuwait?)  
- R - looks for Gulf of Sidra, Tripoli attacks!



Oct 89

Issues:

- Gov. control over military
- Military resistance to NOD, or to lack of <sup>conf</sup> counter-offensive  
or to unilateral measures
- This, likelihood of SC unilateral measures toward NOD
- SC attitude toward balance in Europe

and/or toward prospects for offensive

and/or worth of offensive cap.

[ SC unilat. suggests SC demand toward NATO

"options": Munich, Paris... & Epstein

on one or both counts (balance, offensive)

though they might have concluded that, although  
they were strong, & stronger (they say this) it wasn't  
worth it, or balance.



7. RPK warning - no warning.

focus on it)

8. Monsoon after Cuban II: - through March 63  
- after " 63-Nov 63  
- 1964

9. P&ACM, + similar restrictions on disarm.

X  
winner!

14. Sous: What did K "learn" about JFK -> USG - from Bay of Pigs? Vietnam?  
Wall? Malpatria? Berlin  
Feb 25?  
monsoon? (X)

38: non-Berlin  
since 8 '63

10. (Sous: What K planned for Berlin,  
if missiles remained? What was his aim, needs, or Germany?  
also - (Korean war)? (X)

11. Sous: What K would have done, in Berlin or Germany,  
if missiles struck; or if invasion.  
not first, planned  
SCHLES, RPK 5/12 (X)

US: What would P 23  
JFK have done -  
if missiles not  
disarmed, till  
"operation"? (X)

15. How certain was K that JFK would not disarm? What did he think/look for  
would back if he did?  
12. Sous: What was intent of warnings & assurance on  
Berlin and on election; and timing of proposal  
(was election? To mission from?) (WHY NOT SAHS FIRST?  
(WHAT WAS RUSH?) (X)

WHY WARHEADS  
SENT?  
45, 274-75

13. Sous: Did offer of a private deal on IRBMS have any effect  
at the time? Help later? (X)